MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: A Regional Maritime Security Perspective in West Africa

Keywords: Gulf of Guinea; Regional Security Complexes; Security

Maritime, Piracy, common security.

Summary

This article presents an analytical study of the Gulf of Guinea and its regional impact on common security, highlighting piracy as one of the main maritime threats. The international community, comprised of several countries and organizations, has shown growing concern about the rise of these threats in the region and seeks to cooperate in the area of maritime security, also protecting the vessels that operate there. It is equally important to understand the conditions in surrounding countries, as these directly influence the state of regional security.

Introduction

In recent years, the Gulf of Guinea has profoundly changed the approach to studies and research on maritime security in Africa. This is due to three main reasons, which will be developed throughout the study: first, the significant increase in attacks on vessels in the region; second, the fact that, in the past, attention was focused primarily on the Gulf of Aden; and third, the constant efforts of foreign powers to contain these regional dissenters (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015). The Gulf of Guinea is an area of extreme importance for maritime trade, as well as for various economic activities, both maritime and land-based.

Geographically, the Gulf of Guinea stretches from the west coast of Africa, encompassing countries such as Senegal and Cape Verde, to Angola on the southern coast (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015). It is a maritime strip approximately six thousand kilometers long, bordering more than ten countries. Its importance is evident, as it is a zone of economic exploration that is fundamental to the security and development of territories (Kraska, 2011), especially those with large coastlines and a strong dependence on maritime activities.

To understand the complexity of the region, it is necessary to distinguish between two fundamental concepts: piracy and maritime robbery (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015). Piracy occurs in international waters, where most maritime traffic flows, while robbery occurs in waters under national jurisdiction, whose exploration is regulated by the 1982 Montego Bay Convention. Another relevant concept is sea blindness , described by Jacobsen and Nordby (2015) as the lack of awareness and knowledge about maritime issues, which leads to a political and social devaluation of the issue and, consequently, to the worsening of insecurity and piracy.

The problem of piracy originates on land (Kraska, 2011), resulting from the failure of states to adequately protect their coastal zones. The practice tends to increase when there are no coordinated government efforts. Although motivations vary between political and economic, the methods used by pirates, such as kidnapping crew members, seizing vessels, and stealing cargo, remain similar. In Nigeria, for example, piracy has predominantly economic and political motivations (Kraska, 2011). Nevertheless, this practice remains present in several regions of the world, including the Gulf of Guinea itself.

Development

International Maritime Law is essential to the sovereignty of nations and the balance of global power, addressing issues such as border disputes, shipping routes, maritime accidents, and resource exploitation (Jusbrasil, 2018). Maritime laws have evolved over the centuries with the advancement of navigation, initially established by merchants and navigators who gradually adapted the rules to local maritime cultures. Currently, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) plays a central role in drafting and enforcing international treaties and conventions, promoting maritime safety, and preventing marine pollution.

After the Cold War, world regions became the object of analysis from the perspective of regional security complexes (Buzan and Wæver, 2002). With global multipolarization and the emergence of new hegemons, these regions began to develop strong interactions based on patterns of cooperation and rivalry. Thus, a regional complex is formed from the interdependence between the security problems of geographically close countries. It differs from the concept of a security community proposed by Deutsch (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998), in which states renounce the use of force. In regional complexes, on the contrary, threat and defense remain present, especially in the face of common enemies or strategic interests (Buzan and Wæver, 2002).

In the case of the Gulf of Guinea, rising insecurity constitutes a structural problem (Mvomo Ella and Ukeje, 2013). Both coastal and inland countries, without direct access to the sea, are affected, given their dependence on sea routes for trade and the flow of goods. One of the main factors exacerbating this instability is the poor governance of West African states, many of which face institutional fragility or state failure, such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Conakry.

Maritime problems stem from poor land management (Mvomo Ella and Ukeje, 2013) and are exacerbated by the so-called "invisible threat" of the sea, which escapes governments' control. This threat has led to the recognition of a common enemy and the need for international cooperation to combat it. The growing foreign penetration of the Gulf of Guinea began with the United States' energy policy after September 11, 2011, which began to view the region as an alternative to the tension zones in the Middle East. Other countries, such as Denmark, also became involved for security reasons, due to the increase in ship attacks and regional instability (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2015).

State failure leads to increasing maritime insecurity. Undefined borders, a lack of state cohesion, and persistent post-colonial problems exacerbate the region's vulnerability and encourage the penetration of foreign powers under the guise of stabilization (Mvomo Ella and Ukeje, 2013; Buzan and Wæver, 2002). Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has become a recurring problem since the 1990s, initially observed off the East African coast in the Horn of Africa. Today, the Gulf of Guinea is the scene of illicit activities such as piracy, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal fishing, threatening not only maritime trade routes but also human security and the economic development of the region's countries.

The security issue in the Gulf of Guinea is recognized by the international system

and is one of the reasons to be debated considerably for the importance of the region for the

African continent. According to the U.S. EMBASSY OF ANGOLA, 2015:

The Gulf of Guinea is one of the most dynamic regions in the global energy sector and is critical to the economic development of much of Africa's Atlantic coast. Hydrocarbon revenues provide African states in the region with a strong financial base to invest in development initiatives. Similarly, many of the trade routes connecting Africa to the rest of the world pass through the Gulf of Guinea. In other words, offshore maritime security is closely linked to development and security on land.

The Gulf of Guinea has had commercial activity since before the Scramble for Africa, intensifying after the Berlin Conference, a period in which African countries' diplomacy was heavily influenced by European diplomacy. After the 1990s, the region became a magnet for oil companies due to the discovery of its oil and natural gas potential.

Currently, the Gulf of Guinea is the main oil-producing region in Sub-Saharan Africa, home to the continent's largest producers, namely Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. It produces approximately five million of the nine million barrels extracted daily in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has also become one of the main departure points for oil and gas flows to Europe, the United States, China, India, and Brazil (International Crisis Group, 2012).

In recent decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of pirate attacks, bringing the issue of maritime security to the forefront of international debate. The Gulf of Guinea is currently one of the most targeted regions, not only because of its lucrative oil and gas trade routes but also because of the limited capacity of the region's states to respond effectively to criminal activities. Piracy and other illegal activities have destabilized maritime trade and compromised offshore oil extraction, directly affecting the economies of the countries involved (Escorrega, 2010).

The African continent accounts for 2.9% of global imports and 3.5% of global exports, constituting a significant portion of international trade. A significant portion of this trade depends on the Gulf of Guinea's maritime routes for successful trade. Consequently, piracy and other criminal activities directly affect trade with Africa and other countries using these routes. Thus, maritime security is not only of interest to the region's producing countries, but also to all those who depend on these routes for the movement of goods and people (Barros, 2014).

In 2025, the Gulf of Guinea remains one of the world's most strategic maritime regions, both due to its economic and energy importance and the security challenges it continues to face. Although the number of pirate attacks has decreased compared to previous years, the threat remains. Recent reports indicate that only eleven piracy incidents were recorded in the first half of 2025, but trends over the last fifteen years show that the risk, while reduced, persists (Center for Maritime Strategy, 2025). Despite the statistical reduction, attacks have become more selective and violent. In March 2025, pirates kidnapped crew members from Ghanaian-flagged fishing vessels and, in another case, abducted ten crew members from a Panamanian-flagged oil tanker (Maritime Administration, 2025). These incidents demonstrate that piracy in the region has evolved from simple acts of robbery to structured operations, with characteristics of transnational organized crime and a focus on kidnapping for ransom.

Alongside these events, other forms of maritime crime continue to occur, such as illegal fishing, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking, which undermine the region's economic and environmental sustainability. These practices reflect profound weaknesses in coastal governance and enforcement structures, confirming the thesis that maritime insecurity largely stems from problems on land (Mvomo Ella and Ukeje, 2013). Coastal states and their international partners have intensified cooperative efforts to address maritime insecurity. In May 2025, Portugal launched a maritime patrol mission under the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) program , focusing on the Exclusive Economic Zone of São Tomé and Príncipe (EMGFA, 2025). The mission reinforces the cooperative security architecture enshrined in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct, which since 2013 has served as the primary legal and operational framework for regional maritime security.

In parallel, the region has hosted multinational naval exercises, such as Obangame Express 2025 , which brought together more than thirty countries, including twenty-two African ones, with the aim of strengthening surveillance, rapid response, and information-sharing capabilities (Expresso das Ilhas, 2025). These exercises are considered crucial for building trust among coastal states and reducing dependence on foreign forces for patrols and security operations. Despite the strengthening of regional measures, attacks have not disappeared. On May 30, 2025, the cargo ship MV ORAGE FROST was attacked off the coast of São Tomé and Príncipe, confirming that piracy in the region, although less frequent, maintains operational capacity and adaptability (NIMASA, 2025; IMO, 2025). The partial failure of some coastal states continues to be a determining factor in perpetuating insecurity. Countries like Guinea-Conakry, Mali, and Burkina Faso, although not all with direct access to the sea, influence regional balance through the political and economic instability they export to neighboring countries. This internal fragility, combined with corruption and the lack of effective border control mechanisms, creates favorable conditions for the penetration of transnational organized crime networks.

Another element that characterizes 2025 is the growing use of technology in maritime surveillance. The integration of data from satellites, maritime sensors, and automatic identification systems (AIS) has been applied to predict suspicious behavior and improve preventive response. Algorithm-assisted maritime intelligence platforms, developed in collaboration between European and African centers, allow the identification of anomalous navigation patterns and reduce patrol blind spots (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2025). The 2025 outlook demonstrates that, although states and international organizations have made significant progress, security in the Gulf of Guinea remains vulnerable to political and economic shocks. Initiatives such as AMLEP and Obangame Express demonstrate the potential of multilateral cooperation, but their effectiveness depends on the consolidation of local capabilities, legislative harmonization, and investment in technology and training (Atlantic Council, 2025).

Conclusion

It can be concluded that piracy in regions outside the traditionally highly monitored zones has been steadily increasing, drawing the attention of various international entities, both state and non-state, to the need for joint action. The Gulf of Guinea has established itself as a key focus of analysis and research on maritime security, given its strategic and economic importance to several countries.

Piracy and other related phenomena continue to be a determining factor in the region's growing insecurity. The lack of an effective, properly monitored security regime with the active participation of the countries involved keeps the region vulnerable and without sustainable solutions. The asymmetry between states and the growing penetration of external powers contribute to the perpetuation of the problem, hindering any coordinated and lasting approach to combating it.

In this context, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea can no longer be understood solely as piracy, but as a hybrid phenomenon combining organized crime, state fragility, and geostrategic competition. Creating a common perception of a "maritime enemy" has proven insufficient to generate real cooperation, as the countries themselves face serious internal political, economic, and social challenges.

As long as these structural weaknesses persist, the region will remain highly vulnerable and dependent on external sources of maritime security. Addressing this issue therefore requires a lasting political commitment, supported by robust regional institutions and an integrated, cooperative, and inclusive maritime governance framework.

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